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Abstract   This study comparatively assesses the influence of board busyness (i.e., multiple 
directorships of outside directors) on stock market valuations of both Islamic and conventional 
banks. For a sample of listed banks from 11 countries for the period 2010-2015, results show that 
board busyness is differentially priced by investors depending on the bank type. In conventional 
banks, board busyness is significantly and positively valued by the stock market. This result 
suggests that investors perceive some reputational benefits arising from a busy board (e.g., 
extended industry knowledge, established external networks or facilitation of external market 
sources). In contrast, we find no supporting evidence on the market valuations of board busyness 
in Islamic banks. This result might be attributed to, both, the complex governance structure and 
the uniqueness of the business model which require additional effective monitoring, relative to 
that employed in conventional banking. Our results also show that investors provide significantly 
low market valuations for busy Shari’ah advisory board which acts as an additional layer of 
governance in Islamic banks. Findings in this study offer important policy implications to 
international banking studies and regulations governing countries with dual-banking systems. 
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1 Introduction 
Regulators and market participants in capital markets have long emphasised on the critical role of 
the board of directors, as a core corporate governance mechanism, in promoting a country’s 
economic growth and financial stability. A weak system of governance tends to offer substantial 
managerial opportunities to engage in risk-taking activities and fraudulent acts. Extant literature 
(e.g., Mallette and Fowler 1992; Faleye et al. 2018; Lu and Boateng 2017; Jouida 2019) documents 
that an effective board of directors can monitor top management on behalf of shareholders to 
reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and thereby lessen agency 
costs. Resource dependence theorists assert that a board of directors is "a provider of resources, 
such as legitimacy, advice and council links to other organizations" (Hillman and Dalziel 2003, p. 
383). Therefore, the quality of board monitoring and their engagements in managerial decision-
making can have direct implications on firm value (Yermack 1996; Lin and Liu 2009; Liu 2015; 
Meng et al. 2018). Moreover, the uniqueness of governance in banking alongside the opacity 
related to several banking transactions imply a dominant impact of effective monitoring by the 
board of directors on investors’ trust and optimism (Adams and Mehran 2003; Faleye and Krishnan 
2017). Appointing an outside busy board member (i.e., holding multiple directorships) can, hence, 
affect investors’ perceptions of their firm value. Furthermore, in line with the agency theory, 
investors are likely to pay more for bank equity when their interests are aligned with those of 
directors and managers. In other words, a bank market value is likely to increase as the agency 
conflicts diminish because such lower agency costs can effectively protect investors’ wealth. From 
this perspective, board busyness can influence bank market value by either restricting or 
encouraging managers from expropriating bank resources. This depends on the levels of agency 
costs and the complexity of a bank business model. 
Arguably, busy boards can offer reputational benefits to their firms such as extended business 
networking/connections and quick access to market resources (Brennan et al. 2016). Holding 
multiple board seats can also promote effective monitoring due to rich experience and valuable 
skills from serving many firms (Jiraporn et al. 2008). This might enhance the quality of long-term 
decision making, and hence, such reputational benefits might lead to favourable implications on 
firm value (Field et al. 2013; Muravyev et al. 2016; Chou and Feng 2018). In contrast, other prior 
studies still suggest that board busyness can result in over-commitment and limited availability by 
boards who might be unable to fulfil their fiduciary duties and scrutinise risk-taking activities (Fich 
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and Shivdasani 2006; Falato et al. 2014; Chou and Feng 2018), leading to adverse impact(s) on 
firm valuation. 
Evidence on the market valuations of busy boards of directors is limited (e.g., Ferris et al. 2003; 
Cashman et al. 2012), focused on non-financial firms (i.e., the industrial sector) and provided 
mixed findings. Within the banking setting, examining stock market valuations (see Caprio et al. 
2007; Belkhir 2009; Zulkafli et al. 2010) is restricted to focus only on other corporate governance 
mechanism and characteristics (e.g., ownership structure, shareholder protection laws, board size, 
and CEO duality). Therefore, relatively little is known about whether board busyness can either 
improve or detriment the bank market value. Moreover, none of the prior studies in banking has 
given attention to the possible systematic differences of stock market valuations for busy boards 
across alternative bank types.  
An ideal setting for such an investigation is the unique systems of governance and business 
models employed by the Islamic versus conventional banks1. Investigating the effects of busy 
boards across the two systems is important to the on-going debate associated with factors 
contributing to the resilience and stability of both banking sectors (see Čihák and Hesse 2010; 
Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al. 2013). The rapid growth of Islamic banks implies that the impact 
of this bank type on the global economy might be substantial2. The financial crisis in 2007 has also 
extended the attraction of exploring the market valuation of the Islamic banking model in 
comparison to conventional banking by practitioners and monetary authorities, to explore a viable 
and resilient alternative financial system to the conventional banking system (Wilson 2009). 
Islamic banks conduct operations based primarily on profit-loss sharing (PLS) arrangements, in 
which contracts between the banks and their depositors are equity-based (Olson and Zoubi 2008; 
Mollah et al. 2017).  
The governance structure employed by Islamic banks is likely to be more complicated than that 
of conventional (Safieddine 2009; Mollah and Zaman 2015). In both bank types, the board of 
directors is responsible for the implementation of strategic decisions, protection of the 
shareholders’ interest and maximisation of the bank value. However, for Islamic banks, under the 
                                                          
1 The operations of Islamic banks are principally driven by a constrained banking model, which inherits both moral accountability 
values and legal responsibilities (Abdelsalam et al. 2016). Islamic banks operate on a business model that prohibits interests, 
complex derivatives, short-selling, aggressive risk-taking and speculation while they encourage risk-profit sharing between the 
firms and their depositors. Meanwhile, conventional banks provide their services on interest-basis. 
2 The annual growth of Islamic banking is around 20% in 2012 (Malkawi 2013). Until 2015, their total assets reach $1.38 trillion, 
which is projected to further increase to $6.5 trillion by 2020 (IFSB 2017). From 1998 to 2005, Islamic banks showed tremendous 
growth in their assets by 111% while conventional banks only grew by 6% (Khan 2010). 
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constrained banking model and the nature of the products/services offered, board of directors has 
additional responsibilities related to the establishment of the appropriate Shari’ah governance 
framework besides the development of relevant policies to ensure that all activities are conducted 
in compliance with the Shari’ah law (Quttainah et al. 2013). Furthermore, for Islamic banks, 
additional agency costs are likely to be associated with the Islamic banking model. This is due to 
a peculiar institutional environment in Islamic banks including the special bank-depositors’ 
relationship3. Moreover, unlike the single governance-layer in conventional banks (i.e., board of 
directors), Islamic banks are subject to a double-governance mechanism by a Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board (i.e., SSB) in addition to their regular board of directors4. Decisions by the board of directors 
depend much on the supervision effectiveness of SSB for Shari’ah compliance (Mollah and Zaman 
2015). SSB is hence referred as “supra authority” which monitors the board of directors’ decisions 
to ensure that they execute the ex-ante approved products/services (Beekun and Badawi 2005; 
Godlewski et al. 2016; Alsaadi et al. 2017). Finally, the structure and features of Islamic banking 
governance indicate that the popularity and the scarcity of experts in Shari’ah legitimacy on a 
global basis for both boards of directors and SSB have contributed to the busyness of the two 
boards in Islamic banks5.  
Accordingly, the natures, qualities, and commitments of the board of directors in the two bank 
types are dissimilar (Mollah et al. 2017) and can have implications on investors’ valuation of board 
busyness. Under the presence of structural differences between conventional and Islamic banking 
business models, our premise is that differential stock market valuations of board busyness across 
the two bank types is plausible. Investors within the two banking sectors may hold different 
perceptions of the oversight and resource-creation roles of outside boards depending on the 
banking business model employed and the structure of governance including the need for 
additional monitoring like Shari’ah governance. A lower firm valuation of board busyness in 
Islamic banks is predicted when compared to their conventional counterparts. This is justified by 
                                                          
3 With the absence of representation on the board of directors for depositors, Islamic bank managers have full control of the 
investment process of depositors’ funds which suggest high agency problems. 
4 AAOIFI standard defines Shari’ah supervisory boards as “specialised jurists, particularly in Islamic law and finance, entrusted 
with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising the activities related to Islamic finance to ensure they comply with Shari’ah 
rules and principles” (Lahsansa 2010; p.217). The SSB has both consultative and supervisory functions to support the board of 
directors. 
5 Few Shari’ah scholars who are highly experienced in the inter-disciplines of Shari’ah law and finance (Alnasser and Muhammed 
2012) do exist worldwide. Therefore, there is a limited number of the most prominent scholars dominate the Islamic banking 
industry nowadays (Mollah and Zaman 2015). 
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the extended agency conflicts and the unique business model of Islamic banking, which requires 
effective scrutiny from two different boards (i.e., the board of directors and the SSB).  
We empirically examine whether board busyness is differently valued by investors engaging 
with the Islamic versus conventional banking sectors. We use an international sample of 386 bank-
year observations for listed Islamic and conventional banks operating in 11 countries between 
2010-2015. For the full sample (i.e., Islamic and conventional banks), results show that busy board 
of directors is significantly associated with the high bank value. Conditional on the bank type, we 
find strong evidence of differential market valuations of busy boards between Islamic and 
conventional banks. For conventional banks, investors tend to perceive board busyness as 
significantly increasing bank value. In contrast, investors in Islamic banks seem not to perceive 
board busyness, which reports insignificant results. We take a step ahead to study the channels 
underlying the board busyness and bank value among the two bank types. Our empirical analyses 
involve studying agency conflicts and board compensation channels. We find that board busyness 
is likely to exacerbate agency conflicts within Islamic banks leading to lower market valuation. 
However, this is less pronounced in conventional banks. Furthermore, a busy board of directors is 
associated with low compensation pay-outs. This is more evidential in conventional than Islamic 
banks. It is also more expensive to appoint a busy SSB than non-busy SSB.  
In additional analyses, board busyness becomes significantly perceived as reducing the Islamic 
bank value as the degree of board directorships increases. Moreover, Islamic banks with busy SSB 
exhibit significantly low market value. We also find an inverted U-shaped non-linear relationship 
between busy SSB and stock market valuation: at lower degrees of board busyness, investors tend 
to highly price busy SSB, yet at higher degrees of board busyness, the market value of Islamic 
banks decreases. Our results are robust in several model specifications (i.e., propensity score 
matching, first-differenced regressions and GMM) as well as alternative measures for board 
busyness and bank performance. 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to offer comparative assessments between Islamic and 
conventional banking market valuations by utilising an important board attribute such as busyness. 
The study’s findings are timely to the current debate of the complexity of corporate governance of 
Islamic versus conventional banking (e.g., Mollah and Zaman 2015; Mollah et al. 2017; Lassoued 
et al. 2017; Alandejani et al. 2017; Alqahtani et al. 2017; Elnahass et al. 2018). We extend prior 
literature studies through highlighting to the influence of institutional characteristics and 
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governance structures on having distinct firm valuations for busy boards within the two banking 
sectors. This study also contributes to the stream of banking valuation studies in conventional 
banking (e.g., Caprio et al. 2007; Elyasiani and Zhang 2015) and identifies the possible preferential 
impacts of having a busy board. Moreover, results highlighting the adverse effects of SSB 
busyness on an Islamic bank value also add to a sizeable body of literature on corporate governance 
in Islamic banking discussing the importance of this board (e.g., Quttainah et al. 2013; Abdelsalam 
et al. 2016).  
The findings in this study provide valuable policy implications to regulators and market 
participants involved in the two banking sectors. For conventional banks, board busyness offers 
reputational benefits to banks which tend to contribute to shareholder wealth maximisation. 
However, such reputational benefits of busy boards tend not to hold in complex agency 
environments and constrained business models like Islamic banking. Furthermore, findings 
suggest that effective Shari’ah monitoring seems to be an essential determinant for enhancing the 
market valuations of this banking sector. Our results suggest that market participants engaging 
with the Islamic banking sector tend to be more sensitive to the SSB busyness than the board of 
directors’ busyness. Having busy SSB seems to be negatively perceived by investors probably due 
to concerns related to the effectiveness of Shari’ah governance and moral accountability of the 
bank. Overall findings in this study raise a call to regulators and policymakers for the need to 
develop stricter criteria and guidelines to govern outside board directorships. The study also 
provides valuable insights to inform the debates raised by several external organisations regarding 
restrictions on the board multiple-directorship (e.g., the National Association of Corporate 
Directors-NACD 1996 and the Council of Institutional Investors-CII 2003). 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next section presents the background and 
theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses hypothesis development. Section 4 and 5 present data 
and sample, and methodology, respectively. Section 6 reports empirical results while Section 7 
provides additional testing. Section 8 presents the sensitivities and robustness checks. Finally, 
Section 9 concludes. 
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2  Background and theoretical framework 
A board of directors (BOD) is responsible for approving a bank’s policies, procedures, and 
business strategies as well as resolving investor/manager agency conflicts by setting 
compensation, appointing, replacing and overseeing managers who cannot create value for 
investors. Strong governance implies an active role by boards in monitoring top managers, 
mitigating risks and enhancing long-term resilience all of which should be, in principle, positively 
priced by investors. This argument is in line with the Slack Resource theory which suggests that 
firms with higher market valuation tend to have more economic resources to invest in the long-
term improvements of their governance mechanisms and board monitoring quality. This 
investment will lead to future higher firm valuation, creating a virtuous circle (Pae and Choi 2011). 
However, entrenched managers may have incentives to divert slack resources or free cash flows 
for their private interests (e.g., building an empire, increasing their compensation) (Jensen 1986). 
In such a case, those managers are less likely to use slack resources to invest in strengthening 
different governance mechanisms. Therefore, monitoring the effectiveness of outside directors for 
those managers becomes indispensable. Any reputational damage to the BODs, thus, could 
constitute a severe threat to the survival of the firm, and hence, have an adverse impact on the 
market valuations. 
From an agency theory perspective, ineffective boards can exacerbate agency conflicts between 
investors and managers by encouraging managerial perquisites and private control benefits (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Chen 2016; Boateng et al. 2017; Harkin et al. 2019). As being financially 
independent of insiders, a board should have the ability to withstand pressure from their bank to 
manipulate earnings and monitor the operating process. Hence, appointing outside directors should 
in principle strengthen corporate governance to alleviate the shareholder/manager and controlling-
shareholders/minority-shareholders agency conflicts (Choi et al. 2007; Machuga and Teitel 2009).  
Previous studies on firm valuation and value relevance6 (e.g., Ball et al. 2003; Zoubi et al. 2016; 
Goncalves et al. 2017) document that the value relevance of accounting information is important 
not only for investors but also for standard setters as it provides useful insights into several 
accounting issues. Moreover, information on non-financial indicators such as corporate 
                                                          
6 Value relevance is defined as the ability of an accounting measure to capture and summarise information that affects the firm 
value. This measure is significantly associated with a set of information used by investors in a firm’s valuation such as share prices, 
stock returns, or market capitalisation (Barth et al. 2001). 
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governance mechanisms can still influence the ability of investors to price their firms and forecast 
future stock performance (Bose 2014; Yeh et al. 2015).  
The empirical research on the relationship between governance and firm value suggests that 
well-governed firms are associated with a higher stock market valuation (e.g., Yermack 1996; 
Gompers et al. 2003; Sami et al. 2011; de Haan and Vlahu 2013; Nguyen et al. 2015). Other sets 
of studies show that investors are likely to reward firms with effective governance by assigning a 
high firm value (see Epstein et al. 1994; Brown and Caylor 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; 
Choi and Jung 2008; Baek et al. 2009). Pae and Choi (2011) also state that investors often require 
a lower cost of equity for well-governed firms as these factors can mitigate agency costs and 
enhance disclosure transparency within firms. Caprio et al. (2007) study the effects of governance 
(i.e., ownership structure, shareholder protection laws, cash flow rights, and empowering official 
supervisory and regulatory agencies) on the market valuations of banks. Similarly, Belkhir (2009) 
and Zulkafli et al. (2010) provide evidence on the relationship between bank value and governance 
(i.e., board characteristics, board size and CEO duality).  
With the growing opaqueness surrounding the banking industry, research studies investigating 
the association between firm valuation and board busyness are still scarce. Only within the non-
financial sector, studies have provided mixed evidence on the relationship between board busyness 
and firm value. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show for a sample of large US industrial 
firms (i.e., Forbes 500) that busy outside directors might not be effective monitors on any board, 
and hence, negatively affect market-to-book ratios and governance. Cashman et al. (2012) also 
find that the presence of busy directors has a negative impact on market value, but only of large 
firms (i.e., S&P 500). Contrary, Perry and Peyer (2005) find that outside directorships for 
executives are likely to enhance firm value, possibly through either external networking 
opportunities or through signalling of high quality for the managerial decision-making process. 
They argue that outside directorships only negatively affect market valuations when the firm has 
high agency problems. Furthermore, Ferris et al. (2003) find no evidence that multiple 
directorships can shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees and suggest an 
insignificant linkage between multiple directorships and the likelihood of securities fraud 
litigation.  
Investigating the board busyness attribute emerges from two opposing perspectives. The first 
one is the busyness view which contends that busy outside directors may fail in fulfilling their 
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monitoring role as they are sitting on many boards and are likely to have relatively less time 
available to collect/process information that would support business strategies (Hart 1995; Jackling 
and Johl 2009). Busy outside directors tend to be less effective to monitor and control managerial 
opportunism, unlikely to provide thoughtful advice to executives, and, therefore, board busyness 
is expected to be detrimental to firms in the long-term (Falato et al. 2014; Zhang 2016). Therefore, 
board busyness is associated with weak governance structures (Core et al. 1999). As weak 
governance structure is perceived by market participants leading to low market valuations, market 
participants are more likely to penalise their firms for poor monitoring (Core et al. 1999; Fich and 
Shivdasani 2006).  
The second view is the reputational benefits emerging from appointing a busy board. Board 
busyness is associated with high popularity and reputational capital in the external labour market 
(Masulis and Mobbs 2014). Holding multiple board seats can also improve a board member 
experience, objectiveness, and proficiency in evaluating and overseeing the managers’ decisions 
(Harris and Shimizu 2004; Brennan et al. 2016). Arguably, their social ties make them excellent 
advisors and value-enhancing directors (Field et al. 2013). Busy directors thus can be assessed as 
valuable assets for their firms given their extensive and updated industry-specific knowledge. This 
board can, hence, offer a vital supportive role to inside directors (Clifford et al. 2017) as well as 
have established outside networks that could facilitate access to market sources and other strategic 
benefits. These reputational benefits can be positively priced by investors, and board busyness can 
be perceived as value-enhancing for a firm (Muravyev et al. 2016). 
Moreover, in line with the signalling theory, holding information content constant, firm 
valuations may depend on how information is categorised and presented (Peng and Xiong 2006). 
The extent of disclosure, reporting transparency, and news outcomes signal good news on 
favourable aspects related to financial and corporate information which in turn might lead to stock 
price over-valuing. Under a transactional setting, when an investor is considering purchasing stock 
from a listed firm, this firm might be interested in signalling the hidden value of the equity 
investment (Allen and Faulhaber 1989) or reporting extensive corporate information relating to 
strong governance mechanisms including effective BODs (Higgins and Gulati 2006). Conveying 
information on strong corporate governance to stakeholders eliminates the information asymmetry 
between firm managers and investors (e.g., Ballas et al. 2012; Bergh et al. 2014; Mitra et al. 2019). 
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3 Hypothesis Development 
With the lack of evidence related to the possible effect of board busyness on stock market 
valuations of banks in general terms, additional research gaps emerge which particularly pertain 
to studying this effect within different bank types (i.e., Islamic and conventional banks). Based on 
the two distinct contradicting views of the busy board discussed above (i.e., the busyness versus 
reputational effects) and the limited evidence within the banking setting, we conjecture that board 
busyness can have either positive or negative implications on stock market valuations. However, 
the direction of the association will be ultimately conditional on the system of corporate 
governance employed, the levels of the agency costs and the banking business model, all of which 
could vary depending on the bank type. 
3.1 Market valuations of busy board of directors in Islamic and conventional banks 
Islamic banks are distinguished from conventional banks by several aspects of their business 
models. Unlike conventional banks, depositors/investors in Islamic banks have no right to 
intervene in the financial and operating management of their funds (Abdel Karim 2001). Therefore, 
managers in Islamic banks have full control of the investment process of depositors’ funds which 
offer several opportunities to pursue their own benefits at the expense of their investors, which can 
result in investors carrying additional agency costs (Abdelsalam et al. 2016). Moreover, additional 
agency costs arise in Islamic banking given those outside directors who are expert in Shari’ah 
legitimacy are scarce worldwide, and there are few numbers of prominent and expert outside 
directors who dominate the Islamic banking industry.  
In Islamic banking, board busyness can reduce the monitoring ability of outside directors to 
effectively mitigate and prevent wealth expropriation from minority shareholders which could lead 
to substantial agency costs. Such expectation can be attributed to the limited time and attention 
given by busy outside directors to scrutinise the bank’s operations against risky and opportunistic 
activities/ transactions, which is strictly impermissible according to the Shari’ah governance. 
Furthermore, operating on a constrained banking model might lead investors’ uncertainty 
regarding the streams of future cash flows which must be invested in compliance with the Shari’ah 
rules. Poor monitoring by busy boards can further destroy the trust of investors with regards to 
managers’ discretion and expropriation of rents (e.g., Caprio et al. 2007). Therefore, investors may 
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anticipate that additional cash flow might be diverted, and a smaller portion of the firm’s profits 
will be paid off as dividends (La Porta et al. 2002).  
In contrast, conventional banks operate on a relatively less complex business model which 
facilitate alternative investment channels, quick access to market sources and risk diversifications 
through trading in financial instruments which are prohibited by Islamic banks (e.g., derivatives 
and options). Therefore, the various reputational benefits associated with board busyness are more 
likely to be available and pervasive for conventional banking to enhance the bank equity value, 
when compared to Islamic banking. Signalling such reputational effects to the stock market is 
expected to affect investors’ perceptions of board busyness positively. Moreover, in line with the 
representativeness heuristic theory, individuals are likely to overestimate “the probability of an 
event based on the similarity between its properties and the parent population’s properties”; for 
example, comparing the firm position with its competitors using several benchmark indicators 
(Chan et al. 2004, p.5). For a conventional bank that appoints outside directors who serve in many 
banks, investors may overestimate the probability that these directors are more knowledgeable/ 
reputable and might also overestimate the fact that busy independent directors are certified as 
effective monitors of the banking operations and, hence, investors could anticipate subsequently 
high returns and high firm value.  
Accordingly, published information on board busyness in Islamic banking is expected to signal 
to the stock market weak systems of governance and/or increased cost of equity due to high 
information risk. Investors are expected to perceive board busyness as leading to ineffective 
monitoring quality and may request higher rewards for the possibly arising risks, suggesting lower 
stock price multiples in Islamic banks when compared to their conventional counterparts. This 
prediction is in line with the good management theory (Jamali et al. 2008; Pae and Choi 2011) 
which states that a positive relationship between low-quality monitoring by boards and the 
provision of low-quality corporate-level information. This relation is likely to be pervasive when 
operating under opaque/complex business models. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated 
in the alternative form: 
H1    Board busyness is significantly and highly valued by conventional banks’ when compared 
to Islamic banks’ investors. 
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3.2 Market valuations of busy SSB in Islamic banks 
Islamic banks operate on a double governance mechanism (i.e., BODs and SSB). The presence of 
an extra layer of governance (i.e., SSB) could serve as an effective mechanism to monitor Islamic 
banks’ prioritisation of religious norms. The SSB’s primary role is to ensure Shari’ah compliance 
and minimise reputation risk, which may result in capital erosion among Islamic banks as well as 
in lawsuits by fund providers (Archer and Karim 2007). Members of this board also serve as the 
counterparts of conventional internal auditors who enhance the creditability and reliability of 
published financial and non-financial information in the stock market (Godlewski et al. 2016). 
Therefore, Shari’ah governance is expected to promote investors’ trust and confidence about the 
quality of published information by Islamic banks, who are presumably targeting investments and 
trades incorporate ethical and moral criteria (O’Sullivan 1996; Pomeranz 1997). Therefore, 
investment choices and stock price valuations are likely to be influenced by the outcomes of the 
screening process as well as decisions made by the SSB on the quality and sufficiency of the 
corporate information published by Islamic banks in compliance with the Shari’ah laws. 
To date, a limited number of Shari’ah advisors engage excessively in Islamic banks’ activities 
by sitting on many SSBs for banks operating globally (Wilson 2009; Godlewski et al. 2016). 
Reuters (2012) reports that the top 20 Shari’ah scholars hold about 55% of all board positions 
worldwide, and some scholars are much more in demand than others. As such, busy SSB can 
adversely affect Islamic bank investors’ valuation in two ways. First, given the high concentration 
of the workload undertaken by a small group of Shari’ah experts and the fact that SSBs’ 
performance is not regularly evaluated by the BODs (Mollah and Zaman 2015), SSB is expected 
to be less effective in their Shari’ah monitoring as a result of this such board busyness. This might 
signal a weak Shari’ah governance to the stock market and hence, reduce the bank value. Second, 
the scarcity and high reputation of Shari’ah scholars suggest that they might be expensive to 
appoint because their appointment reflects higher charges of salaries and remunerations which will 
have substantial implications on the bank financial performance leading to lower investor 
valuations. Prior studies suggest that expensive appoints of boards implies low-cost efficiency and 
poor firm performance (see Linn and Park 2005; Brick et al. 2006). This will in fact, directly affect 
the cost of equity and relative firm valuations in stock markets (Renneboog and Zhao 2011). In 
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line with the Equity theory (Dah and Frye 2017), multiple directorships are associated with board 
entrenchment caused by the over-payment for those members7.  
Accordingly, we conjecture that SSB busyness is likely to signal weak Shari’ah governance and 
low bank performance to the stock market leading to low market valuations for Islamic banks. 
This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
 
H2    Islamic banks’ investors negatively value busy SSB. 
 
4 Data and sample 
The consolidated financial data (in U.S. dollars) are collected from DataStream, Bankscope, 
Thomson One Reuters, and Bloomberg databases. We hand-collected the governance data for 
outside directors, Shari’ah advisors and board information from banks’ annual reports, corporate 
filings (e.g., security prospectuses or governance reports) and websites. We excluded grey 
directors who have personal and economic ties with the bank and management (Hsu and Wu, 
2014). We followed Field et al. (2013), Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Chakravarty and 
Rutherford (2017) to count for the number of directorships held by directors in all for-profit private 
and public firms. In other words, we excluded directorships related to activities in sports clubs, 
non-for-profit, trusts and charitable institutions8. Country macroeconomics/governance indicators 
are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  
We study listed Islamic and conventional banks in global stock markets for the period 2010-
2015. The selected period allows us to avoid the potential impact of the global financial crisis 
shock of 2007-2009. The initial sample comprises a total of 3038 banks (196 Islamic banks and 
2842 conventional banks) in 36 countries. In line with prior banking studies (e.g., Beck et al. 2013; 
Alqahtani et al. 2017; Mollah et al. 2017), we applied the following four criteria to filter the 
sample: (1) The countries with both types of banks have at least two listed banks; (2) the banks 
                                                          
7 The equity theory anticipates the reaction of individuals towards over- or under-reward situations. Specifically, directors make 
subjective assessments of the ratio of their efforts (input) and compensation (output) to those of other referents. They may 
experience dissonance if their perceived ratio is unequal to that of referents. Consequently, they often reduce their efforts or try to 
push their compensation to obtain a similar ratio to salient other referents. 
8 For example, the 2014’s annual report of Albarala Banking Group in Bahrain indicates the profile of Mr Abdulla Saleh Kamel 
(Vice Chairman of the board of directors) that is “…Mr. Abdulla Kamel has also been and remains very active in public and 
charitable activities through his membership of many international and local organizations and associations, such as Jeddah 
Chamber of Commerce (twice as Board Member), Young Presidents’ Organization, Friends of Saudi Arabia, The Centennial Fund 
and the Board of Trustees of the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum.” (Page 11). 
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have annual reports (official websites), which are published as of 31 December; (3) The full-
service investment banks and banks with Islamic windows were dropped from the sample9; and 
(4) The banks must have at least three consecutive years’ full data availability. Our final sample is 
an unbalanced panel data set covering 70 listed commercial banks (386 bank-year observations) 
operating in 11 countries. Countries such as Malaysia and Turkey, where Islamic banks have a 
significant share of the total banking industry, have been excluded from the sample as most Islamic 
banks are not listed as separated entities on the stock markets (Saeed and Izzeldin 2016).  
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by country and bank, with 27 listed Islamic banks (150 
bank-year observations) and 43 listed conventional banks (236 bank-year observations). The 
percentage of bank representations is our sample for Islamic banks and conventional banks are 
reported as 38.9% and 61.1% respectively. The highest concentration of Islamic banks is found in 
Bahrain while Indonesia reports the highest level of conventional banks.  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5 Methodology 
5.1 Measures of the bank market value 
Consistent with the prior literature, we measure the bank market value through a firm-level market 
measure which is the Tobin’s q (hereafter, lnQ) (e.g., Cheng et al. 2008; Ammann et al. 2011; 
Cashman et al. 2012; Black et al. 2015; Gyapong et al. 2016; Muravyev et al. 2016). lnQ is a 
forward-looking approximation of firm value that captures the value of intangible corporate 
resources (e.g., goodwill and trust from good board structure). It is estimated as the sum of a bank 
year-end book value of debt and market value of equity, divided by its year-end book value of total 
assets. The market value of equity is computed as the end-year number of outstanding shares 
multiplied by the stock prices (e.g., Busch and Hoffmann 2011; Cashman et al. 2012; Gyapong et 
al. 2016). Following previous studies (e.g., Black et al. 2012), we take the natural logarithm of 
Tobin’s q to mitigate the impact of high-q outlier banks.  
                                                          
9 We refer to conventional banks with Islamic windows as banks with an independent department which provides Islamic products 
with an SSB (Elnahass et al. 2014). Our sample, following the studies of Elnahass et al. (2014; 2018) and Johnes et al. (2014), 
excludes those banks because supervisory issues and accountancy requirements are expected to be different to those of full-ledged 
Islamic banks (Islamic Financial Service Board 2005). 
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The selection of this measure is justified for several reasons. First, we aim to investigate the 
long-term firm valuations of boards’ busyness. Therefore, unlike other short-term accounting 
performance measures such as return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE), lnQ offers long-
term market valuations for a firm (e.g., Bhagat and Black 2001; Thomas and Eden 2004; Sami et 
al. 2011). Second, relative to lnQ, ROA and ROE are likely to be subject to possible and direct 
earnings manipulation by management (Gyapong et al. 2016). Moreover, this measure combines 
the market with book values of the bank equity, distortions from tax laws and accounting 
conventions are minimised (Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988). Finally, lnQ is commonly known 
as one of the standard dependent variables in firm value research within the context of corporate 
governance (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Black et al. 2012; Black et al. 2014).  
5.2 Measures of board busyness 
 
We define a busy board member (i.e., either BODs or SSB) as an individual who holds, at least, 
two outside directorships (e.g., Ferris et al. 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Cashman et al. 2012). 
Based on this and following Falato et al. (2014), Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), and Chou and Feng 
(2018), we use a standard measure of board busyness which is the percentage of busy outside 
directors (%BBOD) and busy Shari’ah scholars (%BSSB). The %BBOD is calculated as the 
number of outside directors serving on two or more outside firms divided by the number of outside 
directors on the board. The %BSSB is defined as the number of Shari’ah advisors serving on at 
least two outside organisations divided by the number of Shari’ah advisors on the board. Using the 
percentage of board busyness provides a plausible assessment of the board advising and 
monitoring intensity under the assumption of high independence, substantial contributions in the 
firm strategic decisions and their sound reputation maintained in the industry (Fich and Shivdasani 
2006). The higher percentage of busy outside directors/Shari’ah advisors, the higher the level of 
busyness of BOD/SSB which influences the monitoring quality of overall board (Ferris et al. 2003; 
Chakravarty and Rutherford 2017). Moreover, we focus on outside directors because they are 
primarily responsible for scrutinising managers while insiders are potentially on BOD for many 
other reasons (Cashman et al. 2012). 
5.3 Empirical models 
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Banks are likely to differ in the opportunities and challenges that they may encounter over the 
years due to the peculiar nature of their sector. This can lead to a situation where disclosure of 
board directorships, other board characteristics and bank market value are jointly and dynamically 
determined by unobserved bank-specific variables (e.g., quality and style of management, business 
strategy, market perception and bank complexity) (Henry 2008; Guest 2009), which pooled 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation may detect and control (Kraatz and Zajac 2001; 
Wooldridge 2002). Therefore, we employ panel data estimations to mitigate endogeneity problems 
arising from potential unobserved bank-specific heterogeneity (e.g., Henry 2008; Guest 2009). 
Although better governance practices of a firm can enhance its profitability position, investors’ 
valuation may only be capturing the high profitability performance rather than perceiving the 
specific board busyness attribute. To overcome possible misinterpretations of the investors’ firm 
valuations, we include a comprehensive set of control variables to mitigate omitted-variable bias 
as well as utilised Three-Stage Least-Square (3SLS) estimations with instrumental variables (IVs) 
(e.g., Bhagat and Black 2001; Coles et al. 2008; Faleye et al. 2011) to mitigate the endogeneity 
between busy boards and bank valuation10.  
The choice of valid IVs implies a correlation with the endogenous variable, and not with the 
error terms of the dependent variable11 (Elyasiani and Jia 2008). Consistent with Elyasiani and 
Zhang (2015), we use the number of public firms headquartered in the same country of the bank 
as our first IVs (source: World Bank). We contend that outside directors of the bank headquartered 
in countries with more public firms are more likely to find additional jobs in other companies. We, 
therefore, expect that the number of busy outside directors is positively related to the number of 
public firms headquartered in the same country. The other IVs employed for board busyness is the 
country-level income generating category (Source: World Bank). This variable takes a value of 1 
if the “home” bank is in a middle and high-income generating nation, and 0 otherwise12. We argue 
that directors of banks headquartered in the high-income countries with more skill-job 
opportunities are more likely to find director positions in other institutions (Goldberg and Pavcnik 
                                                          
10 The Wu-Hausman endogeneity test (e.g., Wu 1973; Hausman 1978) statistics reveal the presence of endogeneity biases. 
11 Two diagnostic tests are performed to examine both IVs’ and the specification of our system equations’ validity. First, we present 
the Sargan test which shows the misspecification test with the null hypothesis of no misspecification. We then report the second 
test (Breusch and Pagan LM) to investigate whether cross-equation disturbances are truly related and if the equations will need to 
be tested simultaneously. These statistics suggest that both IVs theoretically and statistically satisfy the necessary conditions for 
validity and relevance, and thus, findings obtained by 3SLS is more consistent and efficient than those of traditional pooled OLS. 
12 World Bank (2015) classifies countries as middle and high income if their Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is more than 
$1,045. By contrast, countries are categorised as low-income if their GNI per capita is $1,045 or less in 2014. 
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2007; World Bank 2016). This might positively affect the number of the directorships by outside 
boards.  
Both IVs are correlated with possible endogenous variables (i.e., %BBOD; %BSSB) and should 
predict stock market valuations only indirectly, through their effects on endogenous variables (see 
Black et al. 2006). Indeed, in our study setting and sampled banks, those IVs can indirectly affect 
bank valuations because the country-level indicators are less likely to influence Tobin’s q 
endogenously. We, accordingly, specify the simultaneous models as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (1) 
%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (2) 
where lnQit represents the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q for bank i at time t; %BBOD represents 
the percentage of busy outside directors; ϕP is a vector of control variables in the bank valuation 
model. εit is the error term.  
Our control variables include board size (LnBSIZE) to control for the boards’ role and 
effectiveness. This variable is calculated by the natural logarithm of the number of board members 
(Cheng et al. 2008; Mollah and Zaman 2015; Faleye and Krishnan 2017). We further control for 
the board independence (%INDEP), which is measured by the percentage of outside non-executive 
directors on board, respectively (Cashman et al. 2012; Li 2014; Boateng et al. 2017; DeBoskey et 
al. 2019). We also control for bank size (LogTA) by using the natural logarithm of total assets 
measured in thousands of USD of a bank at the end of the fiscal year (Black et al. 2012; Chen et 
al. 2018). We also include financial leverage (LEV), measured by the ratio of total liability over 
total equity, because leverage can affect lnQ through tax benefits and mitigation of free cash flow 
problems (Black et al. 2012; Cheng et al. 2006; Black and Kim 2012). We also control for Big4 
auditor (BIG4) taking a value of 1 when the bank has a big4 auditor and 0 otherwise (Mollah and 
Zaman 2015). We further follow the prior research on governance (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2009; 
Ammann et al. 2011; Luo and Hachiya 2018) to control for the ratio of cash to total assets 
(CASH/ASSETS) and the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (CAPEX/ASSETS). Following 
Mollah et al. (2017) and Chang et al. (2018), we control for the possible effect of banking sector 
concentration on value by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
Moreover, we control for differences in economic development across countries by adding the 
GDP per capita (GDPCAPITA). We finally capture between-country differences in governance 
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perceptions by introducing a country governance index (COUNTRY_GOV) (Kaufmann et al. 2005; 
Čihák and Hesse 2010). This variable is estimated as the average of six governance measures 
including the regulatory quality, the rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, 
governance effectiveness, and the voice and accountability. This index captures cross-country 
differences in institutional developments that are expected to have an impact on banking market 
value. We predict that investors are more likely to invest their capital in the stock market in 
countries with higher COUNTRY_GOV. In other words, the higher the index, the higher the bank 
value.  
We control for both year and bank fixed effects in all models. For the treatment of the outliers, 
we winsorise each variable in our test models at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Table 2 presents 
variable definitions and notations in our estimated models.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample and the banks’ subsamples of Islamic 
banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs). With regards to the bank market value, we find that 
IBs report a higher mean of lnQ (0.259) than that of CBs (0.220). However, the two-sample t-test 
shows an insignificant difference between these two sub-samples. For the governance indicators, 
the full sample reports an average level of board busyness which is 48% for the BODs (%BBOD).  
IBs show a lower mean of %BBOD of 43% while CBs report 51%, t-test show significant mean 
differences between the two bank types’ board busyness. For SSB busyness (%BSSB), the IBs 
subsample reports that SSB has a substantially high level of busyness with a mean of 77.78%. 
Moreover, IBs show significantly larger board size (11 directors) relative to CBs (9 directors). For 
board independence, on average, IBs (CBs) report 33% (36%) respectively, with an insignificant 
difference between the two bank types.  
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Elnahass et al. 2018), our finding suggests that IBs are 
significantly smaller in firm size (LogTA) than CBs. Finally, we find that IBs have significantly 
higher cash to total assets ratio (CASH/ASSETS) than CBs. This result indicates that IBs are more 
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likely to hold cash in response to the arising liquidity management challenges under their 
constrained banking model. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We present the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix of all independent variables for both sub-
samples of IBs and CBs in Table 4 (Panel A and B). The results show accepted correlation 
coefficients (i.e., smaller than 0.8), which suggest that there are no serious concerns for 
multicollinearity. This is also supported by the unreported low individual VIF values (<10), low 
means of VIFs (<6) and low condition numbers (<15) for all the test variables. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
6 Empirical results 
6.1 Market valuations of busy boards of directors in Islamic and conventional banks 
Table 5 reports the three-stage least square (3SLS) estimations examining the effect of board 
busyness on market valuations for the full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B, BOD: column 1; and 
SSB: column 2) and CBs (Panel C) subsamples.  
For the full sample, in Panel A, the coefficient on BOD busyness (%BBOD) is significantly and 
positively associated with lnQ. This implies that investors, on average, perceive board busyness as 
value-enhancing board attribute that increases bank valuations. This result is in line with, both, the 
resource dependence and signalling theories suggesting that outside directors serving on many 
boards can promote strong governance and bring strategic resources (e.g., extended industry 
knowledge, expertise and access to market sources) to their firms and hence, positively valued by 
investors. With respect to the control variables, board size (LogBSIZE) shows a negative and 
significant coefficient, which is consistent with prior evidence predicting that small boards tend to 
perform more effectively than large boards (e.g., Yermack 1996; Eisenberg et al. 1998; Abbott et 
al. 2004; Gyapong et al. 2016)13. The coefficient on board independence (%INDEP) is negative 
and significant which suggests that more outside directors serving on many boards are associated 
                                                          
13  Having a small board associated with high financial ratios (e.g., profitability and operating efficiency) and better CEO 
compensation. As a result, some empirical evidence (e.g., Kini et al. 1995; Yermack 1996) indicate that small boards are preferred 
by institutional investors, dissident directors and corporate raiders.  
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with lower firm valuations (Ararat et al. 2010; Black et al. 2012). Moreover, higher cash reserves 
tend to be associated with lower market valuations, as represented by the negative and significant 
coefficient on CASH/ASSETS ratios. These findings are in line with Ammann et al. (2011). Results 
further show negative associations between lnQ and BIG4. The low valuation for Big4 firms might 
be attributable to investors’ perception that Big 4 is either more expensive to appoint (Craswell et 
al. 2002) or offer similar quality of assurance services to those provided by non-Big4 firms 
(Lawrence et al. 2010). Finally, the significant and positive coefficient on COUNTRY_GOV 
suggests that higher country governance is associated with investors’ valuations.  
When examining the effect of the BOD busyness across the two bank types, in Table 5, we find 
insignificant evidence for the effect of busy outside directors on the market valuations for IBs (in 
Panel B, column 1). This implies that investors in IBs seem not to price board busyness. For CBs 
(in Panel C), we find a positive association between %BBOD and lnQ, suggesting that investors in 
CBs tend to perceive board busyness increases the firm value significantly. The coefficient of busy 
BOD in CBs is also economically significant, as a one per cent increase in board busyness reflects 
an increase in the bank value by 182.6 per cent. Results for the controls across the two bank types 
are generally consistent with the main findings of the full sample. However, we find a positive 
association between the bank size (LogTA) and lnQ for IBs, which implies that large IBs are more 
likely to experience higher market valuation than small IBs. The result may be justified by large 
IBs maintain higher quality financial reporting and stronger governance mechanisms. In contrast, 
such a relationship is significantly negative in CBs, indicating lower pricing by investors of CBs 
for larger banks. These findings are consistent with prior studies (Elnahass et al. 2014; Elnahass 
et al. 2018).  
 Taken together, our findings show that board busyness has a differential effect on the market 
valuations across both bank types. Busy board increases the market valuations for CBs with no 
significant evidence for IBs which is in line with our prediction and supports our first hypothesis 
H1. The positive effect of board busyness on the market valuations of CBs indicates that some 
reputational benefits are likely to dominate investors’ expectations. The emerging reputational 
benefits from board busyness seem to alleviate investors’ uncertainty related to ineffective 
monitoring and agency conflicts between investors and bank managers. This, in turn, leads to high 
market valuations. Our finding is consistent with prior literature within the industrial sector 
settings (e.g., Ammann et al. 2011; Field et al. 2013; Clifford et al. 2017). The absence of market 
20 
 
valuations for IBs can be justified through the signalling theory. Investors in IBs seem to be well 
informed about the importance of effective monitoring as well as the relative implications of poor 
Shari’ah governance. These findings suggest that investors seem to be sceptical of board busyness 
and penalise IBs by not valuing busy outside directors, which is in line with the busyness view.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
6.2 Market Valuations of busy SSB in Islamic banks 
We extend our analyses to test H2 expecting negative market valuations for busy SSB in IBs. In 
Table 5 (Panel B, column 2), results show a negative and significant coefficient on %BSSB which 
suggests that SSB busyness reduces bank value. The coefficient on SSB busyness is also 
economically significant; one per cent increase in SSB busyness, on average, is associated with a 
decrease in the market value of IBs by 136.5 per cent. Results for other control variables remain 
qualitatively unchanged. Busy BODs show an insignificant impact on IBs valuations consistently. 
To examine whether there is a significant difference between the two-board busyness (BOD versus 
SSB) results, we compare the coefficients on %BBOD and %BSSB. The reported F-test (i.e., Wald 
test) indicates that the two coefficients are statistically different. 
Overall findings imply that investors seem to discount the value of IBs appointing busy SSB 
possibly because such busyness could jeopardise their responsibilities and commitments in 
screening out the bank activities/transactions to emphasis on their Shari’ah compliance. Moreover, 
investors seem to differentially perceive busyness of SSB and BOD, placing substantial valuation 
for busy SSB only. This might be justified by the relative high trust and confidence that effective 
Shari’ah monitoring could have in preserving the religious/ethical orientation of this banking 
sector (Elnahass et al. 2018).  
 
7 Additional Testing  
7.1 Tests for the effect of busy boards on bank agency relationships 
High market valuations in banking are likely to be affected by the level of agency costs. Board 
busyness could exacerbate agency costs because a busy board will have less time, effort and 
attention to fulfil their roles and to effectively monitor which could affect market valuations. In 
21 
 
this section, we additionally examine whether busy BOD can either diminish or exacerbate bank 
agency costs across IBs and CBs. To do so, we build simultaneous equation models, which are 
specified in Equation 3 and 4 as bellows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   (3) 
%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4) 
where CASH/ASSETSit represents bank agency relationships, measured by the ratio of cash to total 
assets (see Farag et al. 2018) and a higher ratio indicates more agency costs. We include a 
comprehensive set of controls which can explain for the firm agency costs, such as board size 
(LogBSIZE), board independence (%INDEP), firm size (LogTA), firm age (LogAge), firm risk-
taking (LogZscore), and firm profitability (ROAA) computed by the ratio of net income to average 
total assets. GDP per capita (GDPCAPITA) and country governance index (COUNTRY_GOV). For 
IBs subsample, we also include SSB busyness (%BSSB) and SSB size (LogSSBSize) measured by 
the natural logarithm of the number of Shari’ah scholars serving on SSB. This is consistent with 
Farag et al. (2018). 
Table 6 (Panel A and B) shows that there are differential impacts of board busyness on agency 
costs across IBs and CBs. Conditional on the bank type, busy BOD is significantly and negatively 
associated with agency costs in CBs (i.e., lower agency costs). IBs show significantly high agency 
costs associated with busy boards. This can be attributable to the constrained business model of 
IBs which requires extended monitoring to protect the minority rights of investment account 
holders/ depositors’ who engage with the bank under the profit and loss sharing arrangements. 
Therefore, BOD busyness is less likely to reduce the agency conflicts within this bank model. 
Furthermore, in Table 6 (Panel A), we find that %BSSB has a positive and significant 
relationship with CASH/ASSETS. This confirms that the agency conflicts within IBs are also severe 
when those banks employ a busy SSB member(s). Therefore, lower market valuations for IBs can 
be partly explained by higher agency costs arising from appointing a busy SSB. The reported F-
test (i.e., Wald test) shows that the coefficients of %BBOD and %BSSB are statistically differential. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
7.2 Tests for the influence of boards compensation on busyness 
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In the main result section, we argued that the scarcity and high reputation of Shari’ah scholars 
would imply that they are expensive to appoint and could result in lower cost efficiencies. To 
examine this argument, we conduct additional examinations for the effects of the BODs/SSBs 
compensation on their busyness for both IBs and CBs. The compensation variable is defined as 
the ratio of board total compensation (i.e., the sum of annual directors’ fixed fees like salaries, 
meeting and committee fees, bonus, and in-kind benefits) to the firm’s net income (see Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). Our regressions models employ OLS with robust standard errors and specified in 
Equations 5 and 6 as follows: 
%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑂𝐷𝐶/𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                           (5) 
%𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐶/𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                               (6) 
where BODC/NIit represents the ratio of BOD compensation to net income. SSBC/NIit represents 
the ratio of SSB compensation to net income. Control variables include LogBSIZE, %INDEP, 
ROAA, LogTA, GDPCAPITA, and LogSSBSize. For the full sample, ISLAMIC is also included. 
Table 7 presents the results for the full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B) and CBs (Panel C). We 
find that for the full sample (Panel A), the coefficient on BODC/NI is significant and negative, 
implying that BOD busyness is negatively related to board compensation. A similar result is 
observed for CBs (Panel B), which suggests that low board compensation is a significant 
determinant for outside directors’ busyness in CBs. However, this effect is not evidential in IBs 
due to an insignificant coefficient on BODC/NI (Panel B, column 1). 
Furthermore, in Panel B (column 2), we find a significant and positive association between 
SSBC/NI and %BSSB. The result provides strong evidence for the main findings that employing 
busy Shari’ah advisors is expensive to appoint. This may further explain our main results for the 
low bank value for IBs with busy SSB. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
8 Sensitivity and Robustness Checks  
8.1 Propensity Score Matching Approach 
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Methodological problems such as self-selection bias regarding the endogeneity of the busyness 
could arise when investigating the association between board busyness and market valuations due 
to several reasons. First, comparing between banks having busy boards with other banks with no 
busy boards might yield biased estimates of the board busyness because the market value of the 
latter may differ systematically from the value of the former in the absence of busyness. Thus, if 
banks with busy boards are found to be priced higher, on average, than banks with non-busy 
boards, the difference could be due to differences in banks’ characteristics prior to having busy 
boards. Secondly, considering only banks with busy boards reduces the possibility of having a 
hypothetical benchmark (i.e., the market value of banks with non-busy boards). Additionally, the 
observed change in market valuation could be resulting from shocks influencing all banks equally 
regardless of the busyness board attribute. To overcome these issues, the propensity score 
matching (PSM) method can be utilised as a popular non-parametric approach for estimating 
causal effects (Casu et al. 2013). We apply the PSM approach to gauge the causal relationship 
between board busyness and bank market value. The board busyness is considered as the treatment, 
the banks having busy boards as the group of treated units, and the banks having non-busy boards 
as the group of non-treated units. Accordingly, we define: (i) a treatment (i.e., if a board is involved 
in multiple-directorship), (ii) a group of treated units (i.e., banks with busy boards), and (iii) a 
group of non-treated units as a control group (i.e., banks with non-busy boards) (see Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008).  
We follow the research design of Casu et al. (2013) and implement the PSM method through 3 
steps: (1) estimating propensity scores for the banks having busy boards and banks having non-
busy boards, (2) matching banks having busy boards with those having non-busy boards, and 
finally, (3) estimating average board busyness effects. To estimate the propensity scores, we 
employ a probit regression of a dummy variable that has a value of one for the bank-year 
observations with busy boards (i.e., the fraction of busy outside directors serving on BODs is at 
least 50 per cent) and zero otherwise. The main aim of this test is not to predict the treatment, but 
to balance all the covariates between the two groups (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Given that all 
control variables (i.e., BODC/NI; LogBSIZE; %INDEP; ROAA; LogTA; GDPCAPITA; 
COUNTRY_GOV; ISLAMIC) included in the propensity score model should not be impacted by 
the treatment; hence, they are lagged by one year which is in line with Casu et al. (2013). After 
having estimated the propensity scores of board busyness, we proceed to match banks having busy 
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boards with those having non-busy boards. We use the nearest-neighbor matching approach where 
the unit chosen from the banks with non-busy boards as a match for the banks having busy boards, 
the one closest in terms of the propensity score. Distribution of the Propensity Score of treated and 
non-treated before and after matching is presented in an appendix and shows a good quality of our 
sample matching. Finally, we employ a matched sample to estimate the impacts of board busyness 
on the bank market value. To do so, we first pool the yearly matched banks having busy boards 
and banks having non-busy boards. Then, we compute the changes in market value over a 1-year 
window (presented as “Δ”, that is, Δyit+1 = yit+1 - yit), a 2-year window (presented as “Δ”, that is, 
Δyit+1 = yit+1 - yit-1), and a 3-year window (presented as “Δ”, that is, Δyit+1 = yit+1 - yit-2) and estimate 
the average busyness influences as the differences in the mean changes of the market values 
between banks having busy boards and those with non-busy boards. The statistical significance is 
based on bootstrapped standard errors. If the Δ is different from zero, the change in bank value 
over the time window for the banks having busy boards is different from that for the matched 
banks having non-busy boards (Casu et al. 2013).  
Table 8 reports the PSM estimates of the Average Treatment Effects (ATE) of board busyness 
on bank market value of busy BODs for the full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B) and CBs (Panel 
C) subsamples. The ATE of BOD busyness on bank market value (Δ) is estimated as the difference 
between the mean changes of banks having busy BOD (i.e., “Treated” column) and that of matched 
banks having non-busy BOD (i.e., “Non-treated” column), over a 1-year window, a 2-year window 
and a 3-year window. Results using PSM are generally consistent with our main findings. 
Specifically, we find that for full sample, the Δ is significantly different from zero across all 
alternative measures for bank value which implies that the change in the market value indicator 
over the time (1, 2 and 3) for the banks having busy BOD is different from that for the matched 
observations having non-busy BOD. A positive Δ for bank market value (along with negative 
coefficients for treated and non-treated sample) suggests a smaller drop in the valuation of 
investors for banks having a busy BOD. This finding also indicates a positive effect of busy BOD 
on bank value, which is more pronounced for CBs subsample. As for IBs, a significantly negative 
Δ for bank value (along with positive coefficients for treated and non-treated sample) over a 2-
year window shows a smaller increase in valuation of banks having a busy BOD. Although we 
find a more significant drop in value over a 1-year and a 3-year window for banks having busy 
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BOD, none of these estimates is statistically different from zero. Taken together, the PSM 
approach supports our main findings for the two bank types.  
 
  [Insert Table 8 here] 
8.2 Possible Non-linear relationship between busy boards and bank value 
Prior literature (e.g., Jiraporn et al. 2009) highlights the possible non-linear relationship between 
busy boards and bank value. This is derived from the possible varied impacts of board busyness 
attributes on stock market valuation including busyness and reputation. Jiraporn et al. (2009) argue 
that a simple linear relation cannot fully explain the association between board busyness and firm 
performance. For example, at lower degrees of board directorships, the reputation effect may rise 
higher than a proportional increase in board busyness and hence, it tends to outweigh the cost of 
the busyness effect. However, at higher degrees, this impact may grow less than proportionately 
with an increase in board busyness, leading to the dominance of busyness effect.  
To check if such non-linear relation exists in our sampled IBs and CBs, we add the square of 
BOD busyness (i.e., %BBOD2) into the lnQ models (see Table 5). The same (opposite) direction 
on the coefficient of the square variable (i.e., %BBOD2) relative to its original form (i.e., %BBOD) 
indicates a linear (non-linear) relationship between busy boards and bank value. We define our 
simultaneous equations models in Equations 7 and 8 as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
2 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (7) 
%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡      (8) 
For IBs subsample, in addition to BOD busyness variables (i.e., %BBOD; %BBOD2), we also 
add %BSSB and its square form (i.e., %BSSB2) into the above equations to check the non-linear 
association between SSB busyness and IBs market valuation. 
Table 9 reports our main results for non-linear testing. For CBs, we find the same significant 
and positive sign of %BBOD2, which indicates a simple linear association between busy BOD and 
firm valuation. This supports the distinctiveness of the roles played and value added from BOD in 
this banking model. This also supports our main findings for the preferential impacts of BOD 
busyness on the market valuation of CBs. However, for IBs, the coefficient of %BBOD2 becomes 
negative and significant while the coefficient on %BBOD is insignificant, suggesting that IB 
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investors only begin to negatively price the busyness of BOD at the higher degrees of the board 
outside directorships. Unlike CBs, the reputation effects within IBs appear to reduce proportionally 
as the outside board directorships increase. Hence, at a higher degree of outside directorships, the 
busyness effect seems to outweigh the benefits of the reputation effect in this bank type. 
Furthermore, within IBs, we find the sign of the coefficient on %BSSB2 become significantly 
negative compared to its original form %BSSB. This suggests an inverted non-linear linkage 
between SSB busyness and valuations of IB investors. Specifically, at a lower degree of outside 
directorships, busy SSB is associated with higher investors’ valuations. However, as the degree of 
outside directorships increases, the SSB busyness significantly reduces bank market value, which 
supports our main findings and highlights the detrimental impact of recruiting busy SSB on IBs’ 
valuation due to substantial lax screening.   
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
8.3 Using accounting-based measures for bank performance 
To address potential measurement errors related to the use of Tobin’s q, we use alternative 
measures for bank accounting-based performance represented by the return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Cashman et al., 2012)14. Specifically, we 
examine our two study hypotheses across both bank types using these alternative measures as our 
dependent variables.  
Results are reported in Table 10 for both bank types and, generally, remain unchanged. For IBs, 
we find no significant evidence on the association between firm performance and busy BOD, but 
a busy SSB is associated with significantly low firm performance. In contrast, CBs report a positive 
association between the busy board and each of the indicators ROA and ROE. These results suggest 
that our main findings are not driven by potential measurement errors or model misspecifications 
when using lnQ. 
 [Insert Table 10 here] 
8.4 Using alternative measures for busy boards 
                                                          
14 Unreported descriptive statistics show that IBs have a significantly lower ROA (ROE) of 0.476 (7.707) in comparison with their 
conventional counterparts (1.585; 12.827). 
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We change our measure of busy boards and re-estimated the main models by using an alternative 
measure of board busyness (see Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Cashman et al., 2012). These measures 
are the average outside directorships per outside director (ABOD) and the average outside 
directorships per Shari’ah advisors (ASSB). The results are reported in Table 11 and show 
consistent observations for busy BOD across the two bank types and also for busy SSB within IBs.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
8.5 Using first-differenced regression models 
In this section, we capture unobserved time-invariant effects by employing first-differenced 
regressions for all variables (except for dummy variable BIG4) in 3SLS models. Results for IBs 
and CBs subsample are presented in Table 12 (Panel A and B, respectively). Our results remain 
unchanged for both bank types. That is, a busy BOD in CBs is highly-priced than that in IBs, and 
SSB busyness is detriment the stock market valuations of IBs. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
We additionally test the robustness of our results using a two-step system Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). The GMM 
also controls for the unobserved effects by transforming the variables into first-differences to 
eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. It allows us to treat all bank 
characteristics variables as endogenous and orthogonally employs the lag values of endogenous 
variables as IVs (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Mollah and Zaman 2015; Mollah et al. 2017). 
Macroeconomics control variables are treated as strictly exogenous. Unreported results are found 
to be consistent with the main findings identified through 3SLS. Overall findings in this section 
indicate that our main results are not affected by unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and 
dynamic endogeneity. 
 
9 Conclusions 
Motivated by the long controversy regarding the effect of board busyness on firm value, we 
investigate whether board busyness affects stock market valuations. To the best of our knowledge, 
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it is the ﬁrst study to examine this association in banking and specifically the first study to identify 
possible differential valuations of board busyness across alternative banking systems (i.e., Islamic 
versus conventional banks). Our results indicate that a busy board of directors generally promotes 
high market valuations in support of additional preferential benefits that a busy board can generate 
for their banks. However, investors across the two bank types showed distinct perceptions of 
appointing a busy board of directors. In conventional banks, investors assign a high valuation for 
busy board while Islamic banks’ investors do not significantly price a busy board. Our results also 
show that investors in Islamic banks consistently perceive busy Shari’ah boards as damaging the 
bank value. Additional analyses indicate that underlying channels, such as the agency conflicts 
and board compensation, can explain the different effects between the two bank types of board 
busyness on market valuations.  
Overall findings suggest that investors engaging with Islamic banking tend to be more sensitive 
to SSB busyness while they penalise their banks for not allocating any significant pricing for the 
board of directors’ busyness. These results imply that despite the importance of having a double-
layer governance mechanism in an Islamic banking system, enhancing the credibility and trust for 
this banking business model might not hold in the presence of lax monitoring. This could promote 
withdrawal and systematic risks for this banking sector. Results showing the positive influence of 
board busyness on conventional banks’ valuations can partially alleviate concerns related to 
ineffective monitoring. These findings reinforce the evidence by Conyon and Read (2006) 
indicating that limiting the number of directorships of the board of directors is not necessarily an 
ideal regulatory response to board busyness. Furthermore, Islamic banks can learn from 
conventional banks on how to effectively exploit the possible reputation benefits associated with 
appointing busy outside directors and how to successfully signal such information to stock markets 
to increase the equity value for their banks. 
Findings in this study contribute to the on-going debate related to the different layers of 
governance mechanisms and the importance of considering institutional environments as well as 
distinct business models employed by alternative banking systems. Results in this study can inform 
both investors’ investment choices and regulators about the implications that board busyness could 
have, distinctively, on the two bank types. Moreover, for countries operating on dual-banking 
systems, standard setters should provide detailed guidance to govern board multiple-directorships 
and to consider stock market responsiveness to busyness information within different bank 
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settings. Future research in this arena may extend the busyness issue and assess the economic 
consequences of appointing a busy board with sufficient and relevant qualifications (e.g., 
accounting and financial expertise and continuing education). 
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Appendix: Distribution of the Propensity Score of treated and non-treated before and after matching 
Full Sample: 
 
Islamic banks: 
 
Conventional banks: 
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Table 1    Sample distribution  
Country 
 
Observations 
(Islamic 
banks) 
Observations 
(Conventional 
banks) 
Observations 
(Full sample) 
%                           
   (Islamic 
banks) 
% 
(Conventional 
banks) 
%                           
 (Full 
sample) 
Bahrain 30 30 60 20.00 12.71 15.54 
Bangladesh 36 44 80 24.00 18.64 20.73 
Egypt 3 9 12 2.00 3.81 3.11 
Indonesia 6 66 72 4.00 27.97 18.65 
Jordan 12 29 41 8.00 12.29 10.62 
Kuwait 3 12 15 2.00 5.09 3.89 
Pakistan 24 6 30 16.00 2.54 7.77 
Qatar 18 24 42 12.00 10.17 10.88 
Saudi Arabia 6 6 12 4.00 2.54 3.11 
UAE 6 6 12 4.00 2.54 3.11 
Oman 6 4 10 4.00 1.70 2.59 
Bank-year observations 150 236 386 100 100 100 
Number of banks 27 43 70 - - - 
The table reports the sample distribution of the study. The full sample comprises of 70 listed banks (386 observations) with 27 listed Islamic 
commercial banks (150 observations) and 43 listed conventional commercial banks (236 observations) in 11 countries for the period from 2010 
to 2015. 
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Table 2    Variable definitions  
Variables Abbreviations Definitions 
Tobin’s Q lnQ Natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q ratio, which is calculated by the sum of a bank total debt and market value of 
equity, divided by its book value of total assets. The market value of equity is computed as the number of 
outstanding shares multiplied by the stock prices.  
% Busy Outside Directors %BBOD Percentage of busy independent directors on the board (%), calculated as number of independent directors 
serving on two or more outside firms divided by number of independent directors on the board. 
% Busy Shari’ah Advisors %BSSB Percentage of busy Shari’ah advisors on the board, calculated as number of Shari’ah advisors serving on two 
or more outside firms divided by the number of Shari’ah advisors on the board. 
Board of Directors Size LogBSIZE Natural logarithm of the total number of board of directors’ members. 
Board Independence %INDEP Percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors. 
Bank Size LogTA Natural logarithm of total assets of a bank at the end of the year. 
Capital expenditure/Total assets CAPEX/ASSETS The ratio of capital expenditures to assets 
Cash/Total assets CASH/ASSETS The ratio of cash to total assets 
Leverage LEV Bank leverage, measured by total liability divided by Equity 
Big 4 Audited BIG4 Dummy variable: 1 if the bank is audited by Big4 company, 0 otherwise. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a measure of bank concentration. Higher HHI shows higher bank 
concentration. It is calculated by the square of the sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total 
assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero and one. 
GDP per Capita GDPCAPITA Annual Gross Domestic Products (GDP) over capita (population) 
Country-level Governance Index COUNTRY_GOV Estimated as the average of six governance measures including the regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption, political stability, governance effectiveness, and the voice and accountability. Each component is 
estimated by ranging from -2.5 (weak) to +2.5 (strong). 
Islamic Bank ISLAMIC Dummy variable: 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 for a conventional bank.  
Return on Assets ROA Net income over total assets 
Return on Equity ROE Net income over total equity 
The Average Number of Outside 
Directorships of Outside Directors 
ABOD Average outside directorships per outside director  
The Average Number of Outside 
Directorships of Shari’ah Advisors 
ASSB Average outside directorships per Shari’ah advisors 
Board of Directors Compensation BODC/NI Board of directors’ compensation deflated by net income 
SSB Compensation SSB/NI SSB compensation deflated by net income 
SSB Size LogSSBSize Natural logarithm of the total number of Shari’ah Advisors 
Bank Age LogAge Natural logarithm of the difference between the sample year and the year of a bank’s first appearance. 
Bank Risk-taking LogZscore The distance to default, calculated as the natural logarithm of a sum of the return on assets (ROA) plus Capital 
Assets Ratio (CAR) scaled by the standard deviation of ROA.  
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Table 3    Descriptive statistics 
FULL SAMPLE Islamic banks 
sample mean 
Conventional banks 
sample mean 
Two-sample t-test 
(two-tailed) VARIABLES N Mean Median Std. Min Max 
lnQ 386 0.235 0.029 1.028 -0.219 6.558 0.259 0.220 -0.342 
%BBOD 386 0.479 0.5 0.377 0 1 0.434 0.509 1.908* 
%BSSB 150 0.778 1 0.299 0.111 1 0.778 - - 
BSIZE 386 9.544 9 3.705 3 25 10.647 8.843 -4.512*** 
%INDEP 386 0.348 0.333 0.237 0 1 0.327 0.362 1.322 
LogTA 386 15.407 15.427 1.287 11.999 18.047 15.228 15.522 2.196** 
CAPEX/ASSETS 386 0.316 0.207 0.418 0 3.685 0.300 0.327 0.616 
CASH/ASSETS 386 0.091 0.080 0.059 0.004 0.420 0.102 0.084 -2.701*** 
LEV 386 8.039 7.775 3.774 -4.210 19.998 8.283 7.883 -0.945 
BIG4 386 0.717 1 0.451 0 1 0.620 0 .780 3.320*** 
HHI 386 0.142 0.109 0.095 0.058 0.672 0.159 0.131 -2.573** 
GDPCAPITA 386 18636 3700 26893 760 96732 - - - 
COUNTRY_GOV 386 -0.286 -0.212 0.526 -1.181 0.737 - - - 
The table reports descriptive statistics of all variables employed in the regression models of the study for the full sample and each 
banking sector (Islamic and conventional banks). We also report on the paired sample mean test (T-test). The ***, **, * represents p-
values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. GDP per capita (GDPCAPITA) is measured by the US dollars. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. 
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Table 4    Correlation matrix  
PANEL A: Pairwise correlation matrix for Islamic banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1. %BBOD 1            
2. %BSSB 0.124 1           
3. LogBSIZE 0.076 -0.692* 1          
4. %INDEP 0.418* 0.306* -0.285* 1         
5. LogTA 0.008 0.213* -0.032 0.296* 1        
6. CAPEX/ASSETS 0.043 0.027 0.038 0.077 -0.146 1       
7. CASH/ASSETS 0.176* -0.136 0.420* -0.067 0.075 0.125 1      
8. LEV 0.031 -0.222* 0.288* -0.231* 0.298* -0.057 0.350* 1     
9. BIG4 0.256* 0.592* -0.396* 0.540* 0.496* -0.017 -0.263* -0.378* 1    
10. HHI -0.125 0.238* -0.261* -0.130 0.085 0.093 0.042 -0.012 0.099 1   
11. GDPCAPITA -0.153 0.383* -0.144 0.126 0.465* -0.022 -0.349* -0.333* 0.528* 0.092 1  
12. COUNTRY_GOV 0.071 0.470* -0.126* 0.407* 0.406* -0.021 -0.144 -0.418* 0.649* -0.074 0.628* 1 
PANEL B: Pairwise correlation matrix for conventional banks  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  
1. %BBOD 1            
2. LogBSIZE 0.311* 1           
3. %INDEP 0.020 -0.497* 1          
4. LogTA -0.015 -0.001 0.141* 1         
5. CAPEX/ASSETS -0.042 -0.008 -0.027 -0.418* 1        
6. CASH/ASSETS -0.012 -0.038 -0.076 -0.133* 0.061 1       
7. LEV -0.119 0.022 -0.095 -0.185* -0.109 0.294* 1      
8. BIG4 0.166* -0.083 0.230* 0.426* -0.143* -0.237* -0.540* 1     
9. HHI 0.181* 0.149* -0.077 0.096 -0.096 -0.095 -0.287* 0.319* 1    
10. GDPCAPITA 0.101 -0.053 0.008 0.377* -0.204* -0.336* -0.381* 0.324* 0.351* 1   
11. COUNTRY_GOV 0.164* -0.141* 0.230* 0.447* -0.212* -0.238* -0.567* 0.550* 0.294* 0.601* 1  
The table shows the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among main variables employed in our analysis for the Islamic and conventional banks 
subsamples for years 2010-2015. * are significant at the 5% level. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 5    Boards busyness and bank valuation - within Islamic and conventional banks 
 PANEL A:  
FULL SAMPLE                                    
(IBs and CBs together) 
PANEL B:  
ISLAMIC BANKS  
(IBs) 
PANEL C:  
CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
(CBs) 
VARIABLES lnQ 
(1) 
lnQ 
(2) 
lnQ 
(3) 
lnQ 
(4) 
%BBOD 2.950***(0.000) 0.285(0.109) 0.427(0.104) 1.826***(0.000) 
%BSSB   -1.365***(0.007)  
LogBSIZE -0.391***(0.004) -0.117*(0.096) -0.159*(0.084) 0.152(0.192) 
INDEP -1.006***(0.000) -0.233***(0.004) -0.347***(0.004) -0.786***(0.000) 
LogTA 0.048(0.643) 0.048*(0.087) 0.129**(0.050) -0.278***(0.003) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.003(0.561) 0.002(0.420) 0.005(0.100) -0.002(0.745) 
CASH/ASSETS -2.045***(0.000) -0.713***(0.007) -0.673**(0.036) -1.349***(0.007) 
LEV -0.004(0.719) 0.012**(0.049) 0.017**(0.047) 0.010(0.405) 
BIG4 -0.617***(0.002) -0.147*(0.094) -0.223*(0.094) -0.333***(0.009) 
HHI 0.446(0.125) -0.015(0.869) 0.177(0.190) 0.524(0.131) 
GDPCAPITA -0.014***(0.005) 0.005**(0.011) 0.003(0.339) -0.008**(0.040) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.496**(0.033) -0.028(0.812) 0.042(0.777) 0.395**(0.034) 
ISLAMIC 0.091(0.735)    
Constant 0.465(0.769) -0.350(0.581) -0.247(0.808) 3.379**(0.025) 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Observations 386 150 150 236 
Adjusted R-Square 0.748 0.994 0.990 0.882 
Chi2 
LM Statistics (p-value) 
Sargan test (p-value) 
3164*** 
0.000 
0.414 
2645*** 
0.046 
0.151 
1423*** 
0.000 
0.199 
4480*** 
0.000 
0.376 
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test)   0.000  
The table presents Three-stage Least-Square (3SLS) results for the full sample (Panel A), Islamic bank subsample (Panel B) and Conventional bank subsample (Panel C) identifying the effect of busy 
board of directors or busy SSB on a bank’s firm value. We build simultaneous equations models: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where, ϕP is a vector of control variables in the bank valuation model including bank-level indicators, country-level indicators, and country governance indicators. Models are tested for the period of 
six-year from 2010. The diagnostic tests show that LM Statistics p-value is less than 1% and Sargan test p-value is greater than 10% across all models, indicating that the chosen IVs for board of 
directors’ busyness are valid and the models are not over-identified. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. ISLAMIC is a dummy indicator for Islamic banks which takes the 
value of 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 for conventional banks. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. 
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Table 6    The effects of boards busyness on agency relationships - within Islamic and conventional banks 
 PANEL A:  
ISLAMIC BANKS  
(IBs) 
PANEL B:  
CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
(CBs) 
VARIABLES CASH/ASSETS 
(1) 
CASH/ASSETS 
(2) 
%BBOD 0.033*(0.091) -0.099***(0.000) 
%BSSB 0.211**(0.030)  
LogBSIZE 0.008(0.733) -0.010(0.514) 
%INDEP -0.041*(0.097) 0.020(0.290) 
LogTA 0.046**(0.022) 0.024*(0.084) 
LogAge -0.056**(0.047) -0.016(0.476) 
LogZscore -0.043**(0.021) 0.026*(0.081) 
ROAA -0.001(0.857) 0.012*(0.061) 
GDPCAPITA 0.003(0.859) -0.001***(0.004) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.003(0.933) 0.053*(0.056) 
LogSSBSize 0.068*(0.080)  
Constant -0.512(0.232) -0.321(0.241) 
Year fixed effect YES YES 
Bank fixed effect YES YES 
Observations 150 236 
Overall R2 0.804 0.543 
Wald Chi2                             700*** 463*** 
LM Statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.765 0.832 
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test) 0.002  
This table reports the 3SLS estimation results on the effect of the busy boards (busy BOD and/or busy SSB) on bank agency costs for Islamic banks (Panel A) and 
conventional banks (Panel B). Our model is specified as follows:  
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where CASH/ASSETSit represents agency costs within banks, which is calculated by the ratio of cash divided by total assets. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
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The table presents the OLS regression results for the impacts of boards (BOD/SSB) compensation on their busyness for the full sample (Panel A), Islamic banks 
(Panel B) and Conventional banks subsamples (Panel C) for years 2010-2015. Our model is specified as follows: 
IBs/CBs subsample: %𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑂𝐷𝐶/𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
IBs subsample: %𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐶/𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Compensation of BOD/SSB (BODC/NI; SSBC/NI) is computed as the percentage of net income. Robust standard errors P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
 
 
Table 7    Effects of boards compensation on boards busyness - within Islamic and conventional Banks  
VARIABLES PANEL A:  
FULL SAMPLE                                    
(IBs and CBs together) 
PANEL B:  
ISLAMIC BANKS  
(IBs) 
PANEL C:  
CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
(CBs) 
 %BBOD 
(1) 
%BBOD 
(2) 
%BSSB 
(3) 
%BBOD 
(4) 
BODC/NI -0.155**(0.024) 0.345(0.376)  -0.131**(0.049) 
SSBC/NI   0.454**(0.019)  
LogBSIZE 0.381***(0.000) 0.225**(0.015) -0.115***(0.007) 0.470***(0.000) 
%INDEP 0.576***(0.000) 0.706***(0.000) 0.184***(0.000) 0.480***(0.000) 
ROAA -0.007(0.239) -0.005(0.531) -0.008***(0.003) 0.005(0.797) 
LogTA -0.031*(0.068) -0.010(0.727) 0.011(0.383) -0.042**(0.037) 
GDPCAPITA 0.001(0.304) -0.002***(0.010) 0.001**(0.038) 0.002**(0.017) 
ISLAMIC -0.144***(0.000)    
LogSSBSize   -0.470***(0.000)  
Constant -0.032(0.901) -0.154(0.717) 1.529***(0.000) -0.044(0.893) 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Observations 386 150 150 236 
Overall R2 0.168 0.262 0.793 0.177 
Wald Chi2                   11*** 17*** 94*** 7*** 
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Table 8    Propensity score matching – board of directors’ busyness and bank valuation 
 PANEL A: 
FULL SAMPLE                                     
(IBs and CBs together) 
PANEL B: 
ISLAMIC BANKS 
(IBs) 
PANEL C: 
CONVENTIONAL BANKS 
(CBs) 
Average Treatment Effects  Treated Non-treated Δ (t-stat) Treated Non-treated Δ (t-stat) Treated Non-treated Δ (t-stat) 
1-year window -0.018 -0.057 0.039*  
(1.95) 
-0.014 -0.043 0.029 
(1.68) 
-0.022 -0.150 0.127* 
(1.30) 
2-year window -0.026 -0.111 0.087*** 
(2.90) 
0.002 0.045 -0.043** 
(-2.59) 
-0.037 -0.143 0.106* 
(1.75) 
3-year window -0.030 -0.120 0.090** 
(2.08) 
-0.021 -0.009 -0.012 
(-0.29) 
-0.056 -0.092 0.036* 
(1.90) 
The table reports the propensity score matching estimates of the average treatment effects (ATE) of board busyness on bank market value of busy 
board of directors for full sample (Panel A), Islamic banks (Panel B) and Conventional banks (Panel C) subsamples. The ATE of BOD busyness 
on bank market value (Δ) is estimated as the difference between the mean changes of banks having busy BOD (column “Treated”) and that of 
matched banks having non-busy BOD (column “Non-treated”), over a 1-year window, a 2-year window and a 3-year window. T-statistics based 
on standard errors are presented in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
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Table 9    Possible non-linear relationship between boards busyness and bank market value - within Islamic and 
conventional banks 
 PANEL A:  
ISLAMIC BANKS  
(IBs) 
PANEL B:  
CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
(CBs) 
VARIABLES lnQ 
(1) 
lnQ 
(2) 
%BBOD 1.098(0.103) 0.742**(0.049) 
(%BBOD)2 -0.913*(0.095) 0.963***(0.007) 
%BSSB 5.637***(0.000)  
(%BSSB)2 -3.792***(0.000)  
Bank-level controls YES YES 
Country-level controls YES YES 
Constant -4.471***(0.002) 3.402**(0.040) 
Year fixed effect YES YES 
Bank fixed effect YES YES 
Observations 150 236 
Adjusted R-Square 0.987 0.888 
Chi2 
LM Statistics (p-value) 
Sargan test (p-value) 
1550*** 
0.000 
0.250 
3908*** 
0.000 
0.405 
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test) 0.000  
The table reports 3LS results for possible non-linear relationships between busy boards and bank market valuation for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) 
and Conventional bank subsample (Panel B). We build simultaneous equations models: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡)
2 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (7) 
%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(%𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡)
2 + 𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (8) 
Where, ϕP is a vector of control variables in the bank valuation model including bank-level indicators, country-level indicators, and country governance 
indicators. Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The diagnostic tests show that LM Statistics p-value is less than 1% and Sargan test p-
value is greater than 10% across all models, indicating that the chosen IVs for board of directors’ busyness are valid and the models are not over-identified. 
P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. 
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Table 10    Sensitivity tests: using accounting-based measures for bank performance  
 PANEL A:  
ISLAMIC BANKS  
(IBs) 
PANEL B:  
CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
(CBs) 
VARIABLES ROA 
(1) 
ROE 
(2) 
ROA 
(3) 
ROE 
(4) 
%BBOD 1.741(0.118) 2.020(0.243) 0.792***(0.000) 0.626***(0.000) 
%BSSB -3.012*(0.069) -3.274*(0.071)   
LogBSIZE -0.804**(0.014) -1.079***(0.008) 0.071(0.121) 0.067(0.101) 
INDEP -0.251(0.531) -0.426(0.341) -0.239***(0.000) -0.207***(0.000) 
LogTA -0.396(0.102) -0.020(0.945) -0.057(0.120) -0.040(0.223) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.002(0.806) 0.008(0.458) -0.001(0.914) 0.002(0.773) 
CASH/ASSETS 0.782(0.489) 0.230(0.870) -0.398**(0.049) -0.359**(0.043) 
LEV -0.078***(0.008) -0.056*(0.087) -0.001(0.861) 0.007*(0.072) 
BIG4 0.687(0.123) 0.287(0.548) -0.103**(0.039) -0.081*(0.067) 
HHI 0.469(0.276) 0.652(0.175) -0.063(0.600) -0.017(0.868) 
GDPCAPITA -0.001(0.959) -0.001(0.925) -0.007***(0.000) -0.005***(0.000) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.441(0.382) -0.498(0.357) 0.223***(0.003) 0.133**(0.038) 
Constant 10.545***(0.005) 5.573(0.211) 0.537(0.362) 0.264(0.614) 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Observations 150 150 236 236 
Adjusted R-Square 0.543 0.400 0.504 0.469 
Chi2 
LM Statistics (p-value) 
Sargan test (p-value) 
100*** 
0.000 
0.260 
68*** 
0.000 
0.236 
379*** 
0.000 
0.105 
238*** 
0.000 
0.143 
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test) 0.000 0.000   
The table presents 3SLS results when using an accounting-based measures for bank performance: (1) return on assets (ROA) and (2) return on equity (ROE) for the Islamic 
bank subsample (Panel A) and Conventional bank subsample (Panel B). P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. 
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Table 11    Sensitivity tests: using alternative measure for boards busyness  
 PANEL A:  
ISLAMIC BANKS  
(IBs) 
PANEL B:  
CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
(CBs) 
VARIABLES lnQ 
(1) 
LnQ 
(2) 
ABOD -0.046(0.349) 0.080***(0.000) 
ASSB -1.256**(0.049)  
LogBSIZE -0.603**(0.014) 0.100(0.129) 
INDEP -0.715**(0.028) -0.254***(0.003) 
LogTA -0.426(0.125) -0.168***(0.004) 
CAPEX/ASSETS -0.032(0.120) -0.001(0.737) 
CASH/ASSETS 3.317(0.101) -0.107(0.750) 
LEV -0.062(0.137) 0.003(0.643) 
BIG4 -2.435**(0.049) -0.076(0.286) 
HHI -1.326*(0.065) 0.428**(0.024) 
GDPCAPITA 0.002(0.797) -0.006**(0.029) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.362(0.401) 0.196*(0.069) 
Constant 28.750**(0.049) 2.221**(0.024) 
Year fixed effect YES YES 
Bank fixed effect YES YES 
Observations 150 236 
Adjusted R-Square 0.823 0.978 
Chi2 
LM Statistics (p-value) 
Sargan test (p-value) 
2625*** 
0.000 
0.114 
1082*** 
0.000 
0.157 
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test) 0.000  
The table presents 3SLS results when using an alternative measure of board busyness: (1) average outside directorships per outside director 
(ABOD) and (2) average outside directorships per Shari’ah advisors (ASSB) for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) and Conventional bank 
subsample (Panel B). P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. 
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Table 12    Robustness Checks: Using First-differenced Regression Models 
 PANEL A:  
ISLAMIC BANKS  
(IBs) 
PANEL B:  
CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
(CBs) 
VARIABLES lnQ 
(1) 
lnQ 
(2) 
D.%BBOD 0.121(0.202) 0.382***(0.000) 
D.%BSSB -0.741***(0.007)  
D.LogBSIZE 0.045(0.386) 0.103(0.176) 
D.INDEP -0.026(0.752) -0.220*(0.085) 
D.LogTA 0.036(0.568) 0.228**(0.014) 
D.CAPEX/ASSETS 0.003**(0.046) -0.001(0.802) 
D.CASH/ASSETS 0.057(0.786) -0.588*(0.098) 
D.LEV 0.018***(0.009) -0.012(0.165) 
BIG4 -0.047**(0.027) -0.081(0.377) 
D.HHI 0.018(0.808) 0.397*(0.088) 
D.GDPCAPITA -0.001(0.434) -0.001**(0.045) 
D.COUNTRY_GOV 0.023(0.365) 0.137***(0.001) 
Constant -0.064**(0.028) 0.016(0.618) 
Year fixed effect YES YES 
Observations 123 193 
Adjusted R-Square 0.008 0.267 
Chi2 
LM Statistics (p-value) 
Sargan test (p-value) 
42*** 
0.000 
0.243 
55*** 
0.000 
0.063 
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test) 0.000    
The table presents first-differenced regression (3SLS) results for the Islamic bank subsample (Panel A) and Conventional 
bank subsample (Panel B) identifying the effect of busy board of directors or busy SSB on a bank’s firm value. P-values in 
parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. First-differenced models are used to control for time-invariant unobserved 
effects. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. 
 
